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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On February 15, 2006, the House Committee on International Relations 
invited executives from Google, Inc., Microsoft Corp., Yahoo!, Inc., and 
Cisco Systems, Inc. to what was supposed to be a “discussion” about 
these American corporations’ cooperation with China to enforce Chinese 
Internet censorship and persecute China’s political dissidents.1  Instead, 
Congressman Christopher Smith (R-NJ) launched a scathing attack on 
the executives, listing names of dissidents jailed for their Internet 
postings and reminding the corporations of their roles in the dissidents’ 
captures.2  Congressman Smith next accused Google of compromising 
its do-no-evil policy by bowing to the will of China’s oppressive 
government.3  Congressman Smith also compared the corporations to 
IBM in Nazi Germany and alleged, “U.S. technology companies today 
are engaged in a similar sickening collaboration, decapitating the voice 
of the dissidents.”4  Congressman Tom Lantos (D-Cal.) summarized the 
reason for the hearing: “What Congress is looking for is real spine and a 
willingness to stand up to the outrageous demands of a totalitarian 
regime.  Your abhorrent activities in China are a disgrace.”5 
During the ensuing interrogation, the corporations attempted to defend 
their actions by arguing they picked the lesser of two evils: complying 
with Chinese law by censoring the Internet, instead of leaving the 
Chinese market altogether and thus allowing the Chinese search engines 
to conduct their own censorship, presumably more rigorously than their 
 1. See The Internet in China: A Tool for Freedom or Suppression?: Joint Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Africa., Global Human Rights and Int’l Operations and the 
Subcomm. on Asia and the Pacific, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Hearing]. 
 2. These include online posters Li Zhi and Shi Tao, who drew eight and ten years 
respectively in prison for expressing their opinions on the Internet.  Yahoo! Inc. provided 
the Chinese government with the physical location of these online posters.  Id. at 1–2, 10 
(statements of Rep. Christopher Smith, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Africa, Global Human 
Rights and International Operations and Rep. James Leach, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on 
Asia and the Pacific).  In addition to Yahoo!’s cooperation with the Chinese government 
in enforcing China’s Internet censorship regulations, Google stands accused of censoring 
its search engine at the request of the Chinese government, Microsoft of censoring 
personal websites by Chinese citizens that express opinions contrary to that of the government, 
and Cisco Systems (an Internet hardware company) of providing the Chinese government 
with the technology necessary to control the Internet.  Id. at 3. 
 3. Id. at 3. 
 4. His reference here is from Edwin Black’s book documenting how IBM 
knowingly provided Nazi Germany with the ability to operate at “Blitzkrieg efficiency.”  
Id. at 2 (statement of Rep. Christopher Smith); see EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE 
HOLOCAUST 203 (2001); see also THE CORPORATION (Zeitgeist Films 2004) (exploring 
IBM’s role in aiding Nazi Germany).  In its own defense, IBM states that the Nazi party, 
apart from IBM, controlled IBM’s German subsidiary. 
 5. Hearing, supra note 1, at 8 (statement of Rep. Tom Lantos, Member, H. 
Subcomm. on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations). 
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American counterparts.6  Congressman Lantos, however, addressed the 
executives in plain speech, asking each if he was ashamed of the actions 
of each corporation or could see the similarities between the corporation’s 
actions and that of IBM in aiding Nazi Germany.7  The executives 
avoided the question.8 
After Congressman Lantos concluded his inquiry into the morality of 
their actions, Congressman Brad Sherman (D-Cal.) addressed the legal issue: 
[W]hat have you done to tell your Chinese customers that they have a lower 
expectation of privacy and that you will comply not with the law of your 
democratically elected host government, namely the United States, but rather 
 6. From the hearing transcript, edited for clarity: 
[YAHOO]  Our belief, Mr. Congressman, is that the benefits of having access 
to communication service, as well as access to independent sources of 
information, coupled with the extreme large number of searches and other 
activity that happens on the Web, provides an extraordinary benefit.  We 
recognize these extreme challenges as well, and we are ready to tackle those, 
along with our industry peers and with government, in partnership to make this 
a government-to-government dialogue. 
[MICROSOFT]  I would just reiterate that we think these are very difficult 
issues, which I think is clear from some of the questions from the Members, 
but we, too, think, on balance, that it is better for Microsoft and the other 
companies here at the table and other United States Internet companies to be 
engaged in China.  We think that the benefits far outweigh the downside in 
terms of promoting freedom of expression. 
[GOOGLE]  We made the decision to enter the market because we believe in 
making information available and accessible.  We believe that doing that will 
achieve positive things.  As I said in my testimony and in my oral statement, if, 
over time, we do not achieve the results that we seek, because your question is 
a legitimate one, we will reconsider our role there. 
[CISCO]  The Internet is many different things to different people.  For some, 
it is a source of empowerment, enlightenment, giving them access to information 
they never had before.  Others are frightened by that empowerment and see 
nonstate actors, whether they are multinational corporations or terrorists or 
antiglobalization activists, empowered against legitimate state authority, and 
others see the Internet being used as a tool of repression.  I think all of those 
are correct. 
Id. at 90.  For the opposing view that globalization alone is enough to bring democracy 
and freedom to less democratic governments, see THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS 
FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 10 (2005) (claiming that 
globalization has “made us all next-door neighbors”). 
 7. “Can you say in English that you are ashamed of what you and your company 
and the other companies have done? . . .  IBM complied with legal orders when they 
cooperated with Nazi Germany. . . .  [D]o you think that IBM, during that period, had 
something to be ashamed of?”  Hearing, supra note 1, at 97–98 (statement of Rep. Tom 
Lantos). 
 8. Id. 





that you will furnish information upon the request of an un-elected, un-
democratic and oppressive government in China?9 
This Comment will focus on the issue of the role of American 
corporations in enforcing Chinese censorship law. 
In the hands of the Chinese government, the increased freedom of 
speech granted by the Internet and brought to China via American 
corporations is curtailed by state-sponsored censorship.  To do business 
in China, American companies must comply with Chinese Internet 
censorship laws, yet these very laws not only restrain the freedom of 
speech of Chinese citizens but also subject offenders to the whim of the 
Chinese secret police.  As accurately stated in the hearing, Yahoo! aided 
China in arresting at least two Chinese online writers for the crime of 
disagreeing with the government.10  The United States must act to stop 
American corporations from further participating in China’s persecution 
of its political dissidents. 
At the conclusion of this hearing, Congress proposed a possible 
solution in the Global Online Freedom Act, a bill that would reach and 
punish American companies engaged in enforcing Chinese state-sponsored 
censorship.11  Although the bill embodies ambitious ideals, as this 
Comment explains, its passage forces other nations to follow United 
States law wherever private United States companies operate.12  Instead, 
Congress should examine additional short-term solutions that avoid 
imposing American law onto another sovereign nation and circumvent 
unresolved issues of international Internet re 13
Part II of the Comment briefly surveys the history of the Internet, 
focusing on previous attempts at Internet regulation, both domestic and 
foreign.  It will highlight the social causes of these regulations and 
explore the results when social values in one country do not comport 
with the values in another.  Part III addresses the Global Online Freedom 
Act, particularly its purpose, provisions, and criticisms.  This Part also 
considers alternative short-term solutions to this bill that avoid the 
 9. Id. at 117.  Here, Congressman Sherman uses the term expectation of privacy 
not in a legal sense, but in a colloquial sense to convey that the corporations do not 
afford equal treatment to Chinese citizens, as opposed to American customers. 
 10. See Amnesty International, Undermining Freedom of Expression in China, 
July 2006, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGPOL300262006. 
 11. Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. (2006); Global 
Online Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. (as reported by H. Comm. on 
Foreign Affairs on Dec. 10, 2007). 
 12. See infra Part III.A. 
 13. The best long-term solution to this conundrum would be the enactment of 
international Internet regulations.  However, this Comment will not explore in depth this 
much larger and more complex question of whether worldwide Internet laws should be 
enacted and whether the Internet should even come under international control. 
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that user’s cyberspace.22  Moreover, Internet information dwells in this 
blatant interjection of United States law into another sovereign state and 
analyzes the viability and requirements for the success of these solutions 
in China.  Part IV follows with a final recommendation of the best course of 
action at this time: the promotion of proxy-blocking Internet services 
coupled with the economic pressure of the international community to 
force China to cease persecution of its online political dissidents. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Initial Promise of the Internet 
In 1969, the United States military envisioned a system that could link 
military, defense, and university members engaged in defense 
research.14  From this vision, the Defense Advanced Research Project 
Agency (DARPA) invented the ARPANET (Advanced Research Project 
Network), the early precursor to the Internet.15  The ARPANET consisted 
of an intangible network connecting innumerable smaller groups of 
computer networks.16  ARPANET facilitated the decentralized and rapid 
transmission of information from individual to individual.17  As it grew in 
use and popularity, networks similar to ARPANET sprung up, linking 
businesses, universities, and research facilities around the world.18  
Eventually these networks merged together into what is known today as 
the Internet.19  In the 1980s, the Internet experienced extraordinary 
growth so that today the Internet connects one billion users 
untry in the world.20 
The secret of the Internet’s success has remained unchanged from its 
inception to present time; as a completely decentralized, self-maintaining 
entity, the control of information lies in the hands of each user.21  Whatever 
each user chooses to view, publish, or discuss defines the boundaries of 
 
 14. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 
9 arizing the creation and development of the Internet). 
BITNET, FIDONET, and USENET.  Id. 
ge by country 
www.internetworldstats.com. 
(1 97) (summ
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.  These networks included 
 19. Id. 
 20. Internet World Stats is commonly cited authority on Internet usa
and worldwide.  Internet World Stats, http://
 21. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831, 838. 
 22. Cyberspace, the term now used almost synonymously with Internet to describe 
that nebulous realm where humans can gather to exchange ideas, was originally coined 




cyberspace—inside an intangible realm that has no centralized storage 
location or control point.23  Consequently, it eludes the control of any 
single business, individual, or country.24 
The Internet’s power stems from its ability to grant an unprecedented 
forum for free speech.25  Using the Internet, users can communicate via 
email, bulletin boards, public forums, and chat rooms.26  More recently, 
web blogs have surged in popularity, significantly adding to the amount 
of personal websites.  In addition, the convenience and affordability of 
the Internet allows almost any individual with a computer and network 
connection to broadcast opinions and thoughts worldwide.27  The resulting 
erasure of the lines defining race and wealth creates a truly democratic 
forum.  Nongovernmental and political organizations also discovered the 
Internet’s usefulness in championing lesser known causes because it 
provides a cheap and effective means of reaching target audiences.28  Even 
today, some believe democracy will come to China through the inherent 
properties of the Internet; a generation of Chinese citizens growing up 
with the ability to exercise unrestricted public speech online every day 
will set the foundation for a more democratic society.29 
by science fiction author William Gibson.  W G , E NEW ILLIAM IBSON  NCYCLOPEDIA OF 
MEDIA 112 (2003).  He defined cyberspace as a “consensual hallucination.”  WILLIAM 
GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 5 (1984). 
 23. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831. 
 24. Id. at 832. 
 25. As John Perry Barlow, cofounder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, put it 
in 1996, “We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace.  May it be more 
humane and fair than the world your governments have made before.”  See John Perry 
Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996), http://homes. 
eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html.  Barlow’s widely circulated sixteen-paragraph 
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace captures the early fascination and 
excitement of the Internet.  Id. 
 26. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834; see also Elizabeth A. Ritvo, Online Forums and 
Chat Rooms in Defamation Actions, 24 COMM. LAW. 1 (2006) (explaining how the 
hearsay exceptions can aid plaintiffs in admitting defamatory chat room statements as 
evidence). 
 27. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 838. 
 28. See id. at 842–43.  Presidential candidate Howard Dean raised more money 
than any other Democratic candidate.  His fundraising success came as a result of his 
supporters on the political websites Meetup.com and Moveon.org.  See Gary Wolf, How 
the Internet Invented Howard Dean, WIRED, Jan. 2004, at 138, available at http://www. 
wired.com/wired/archive/12.01/dean_pr.html.  Even the United States government uses 
the Internet for military recruitment.  The Marines use MySpace, a popular social 
networking site among teenagers and young adults, to direct visitors to its recruitment 
centers.  Their site is located at http://www.myspace.com/themarinecorps (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2008). 
 29. Clive Thompson, Google’s China Problem (and China’s Google Problem), 
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 23, 2006, at 156. 
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B.  United States Internet Regulations 
Unfortunately, this new medium for free speech ushered in a new era 
of exploitation.30  In the United States, the Internet led to the proliferation of 
child pornography,31 the defamation of corporations and individuals,32 
and the unmasking and subsequent punishment of anonymous writers.33  
Congress responded to these unforeseen issues by encouraging the 
privatization of parts of the Internet, effectively bringing those parts 
outside the reach of the First Amendment.34  To protect the American 
public, Congress passed laws regulating the public aspects of the Internet.  
However, the Supreme Court has consistently used the First Amendment 
to strike down these statutes. 
To ban online access to child pornography and to protect minors from 
“indecent” and “patently offensive” materials, Congress passed the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA).35  The CDA criminalized 
the use of a computer to display or send comments, images, or 
 30. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 824, 844. 
 31. For an overview of the difficulties in enforcing child online pornography in the 
United States and overseas, see Alexander Shytov, Indecency on the Internet and 
International Law, 13 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 260 (2005) (discussing differences in 
laws, culture, and opinions between countries as to how best to deal with online child 
pornography). 
 32. Websites such as Don’t Date Him Girl, http://www.dontdatehimgirl.com/ 
home/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2008), allow users to warn others about bad dates, often 
identifying the date by real name or screenname.  A Pittsburgh resident sued the site for 
defamation after users labeled him a homosexual and a carrier of sexually transmitted 
diseases.  On April 5, 2007, a Pennsylvania court dismissed his case for lack of 
jurisdiction.  See Memorandum and Order of Court, Hollis v. Joseph, No. GD06-012677 
(Pa. D. & C. Apr. 5, 2007), available at http://howappealing.law.com/ 2007040910031 
8184.pdf; see also Lizette Alvarez, (Name Here) is a Liar and a Cheat, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
16, 2006, at G1. 
 33. Perhaps the most well-known anonymous website on the workings of the 
federal judiciary, Underneath Their Robes, turned out to be the work of an assistant 
United States attorney.  Once his identity was discovered, the site was removed.  See 
Adam Liptik, Mystery of Gossipy Blog On the Judiciary Is Solved, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 
2005, at A14. 
 34. See generally Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in 
Cyberspace, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115 (2005) (discussing the increasing regulations 
on the previously unregulated areas in cyberspace of chat rooms and discussion boards). 
 35. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 849–50.  Had it passed in its entirety, the CDA would 
have been codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)–(h).  Id. at 827 n.1.  However, the court only 
struck out the offending provisions; the other parts of the CDA were signed into law and 
are scattered throughout the Code. 




communications deemed patently offensive, as determined by contemporary 
community standards.36 
On the day President Clinton signed the CDA into law, the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and eighteen other mostly nonprofit 
organizations filed suit claiming that the statute violated the First 
Amendment’s right to freedom of speech.37  The case went to the Supreme 
Court where the plaintiffs ultimately prevailed.  The Court, troubled by 
the lack of definitions for the terms indecent and patently offensive, and 
by the government’s use of the terms interchangeably in the statute, 
ultimately ruled these sections of the CDA to be overly broad and 
therefore unconstitutional.38 
In making its ruling, the Court relied on the opinion of the district 
court,39 which in turn relied heavily on this nation’s historical deference 
to First Amendment rights.40  The district court found the CDA was not 
narrowly tailored to warrant such a “patent intrusion on a substantial 
category of protected speech for adults.”41  The “loss of First Amendment 
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes 
irreparable injury.”42 
This deference to First Amendment rights continued in Ashcroft v. 
ACLU.43  In response to the defeat of the CDA, and to answer 
continuing public concern regarding online child pornography, Congress 
passed the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) in 1998.44  Ashcroft v. 
ACLU involved COPA’s criminalization of those who knowingly posted 
 36. Id. at 829. 
 37. Id. at 827 n.2.  In addition to the ACLU, the plaintiffs included Human Rights 
Watch, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Stop 
Prisoner Rape, AIDS Education Global Information System, Planned Parenthood, 
Journalism Education Center, and many more.  Id. 
 38. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 at 870–71 (1997).  Compare 47 U.S.C. § 223 
(2003), with 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000) (demonstrating Congress amended the CDA in 2003 
to remove the offending sections). 
 39. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 
(1997). 
 40. This deference is present in prior court opinions.  The Supreme Court has 
stated that “in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are . . . 
essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of citizens of a 
democracy.”  New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (quoting Cantwell 
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)). 
 41. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 855 (agreeing with plaintiffs that a ban on patently 
offensive materials would hinder campaigns against genital mutilation and prison rape). 
 42. Id. at 851 (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)). 
 43. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
 44. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000), invalidated by ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 
775 (E.D. Pa. 2007).  The legislative findings in COPA state: “[T]he protection of the 
physical and psychological well-being of minors by shielding them from materials that 
are harmful to them is a compelling governmental interest.”  Child Online Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1402, 112 Stat. 2681-736 (1998). 
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may not move on to the Senate to continue the debate.51 
online content harmful to minors for commercial purposes.45  Unlike the 
CDA, COPA defined commercial purpose and allowed an affirmative 
defense to those who use specified means to prevent minors from 
accessing a particular website.46  Even these details, however, failed to 
satisfy the Supreme Court.  Despite an affirmative defense, speakers may 
still censor themselves rather than face possible prosecution, resulting in 
“extraordinary harm” and causing a “serious chill upon
eech.”47 
This clash between restricting child exploitation on the Internet and 
preserving the Internet’s promise as a forum for free speech continues 
today.  The House of Representatives recently introduced the Deleting 
Online Predators Act of 2007 (DOPA).48  DOPA would force federally 
funded libraries to block any “commercial social networking website or 
chat room,” ideally to prevent students from entering into chat rooms at 
school and potentially conversing with sexual predators.49  Like the 
CDA and COPA, however, DOPA’s main problem may be its broad 
definition of “commercial social networking sites.”50  This bill m
 
 45. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 659–60. 
 46. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2).  “Specified means” include restricting access to minors 
by requiring any of the following: a credit card, debit account, adult access code, digital 
certificate verifying age, or “any other reasonable measures that are feasible under 
va
es but remanded the case for proceedings consistent with the reasoning of 
t.
ng. § 2 (2007) 
[O
ll, These Days No. 1 
nline discussions.  The passage of this 
ll
a ilable technology.”  Id. § 231(c)(1). 
 47. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 671.  The Court agreed with the Third Circuit’s decision 
in finding that COPA was not the least restrictive means of protecting minors from 
harmful websit
the Cour   Id. 
 48. Deleting Online Predators Act of 2007, H.R. 1120, 110th Co
(“ ]ne in five children has been approached sexually on the Internet.”). 
 49. Id. § 3(b)(i)(II).  Common social networking sites include MySpace.com, 
http://www.myspace.com (last visited Mar. 14, 2008), and Facebook.com, 
http://www.facebook.com (last visited Mar. 14, 2008).  In 2006, MySpace had an 
estimated worth of $2 billion.  Andrew Ross Sorkin & Peter Edmonston, Google Is Said 
to Set Sights on YouTube, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2006, at C9.  In October 2006, Yahoo! 
reportedly offered to buy the less popular Facebook for $900 million.  Saul Hansell, 
Yahoo Woos Social Networking Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2006, at C1.  On a side note, 
Google has since acquired YouTube for $1.65 billion in stock.  Yahoo! reportedly flirted 
with the idea of buying YouTube but talks broke down.  Saul Hanse
Portal Seems to be a Step Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at C1. 
 50. As defined in DOPA, commercial social networking sites allow the creation of 
user-specific profiles to participate in forums and chat rooms.  H.R. 1120 § 3(c)(J)(ii).  
However, common websites hosted by Yahoo!, Amazon, and the New York Times all 
allow users to create profiles and participate in o
bi  could block these sites from school libraries. 
 51. At the time of this Comment, the bill sits before the House Committee on 




The United States’ tolerance for racist or Nazi websites, in contrast to 
foreign countries that censor these sites, further reflects the comparably 
liberal free speech policy.52  Perhaps as a result of this policy, 
defamation law on the Internet remains an area largely unexplored by 
the courts of this country.  In Gertz v. Welch, the Court carved out an 
exception to the right to free speech, protecting private individuals from 
defamatory accusations.53  However, lawsuits concerning defamatory 
accusations on the Internet have only just begun to surface.54  It appears 
unclear whether the Court will treat defamation on the Internet in the 
same manner as defamation in print media.55 
Energy and Commerce.  MySpace, though, has taken the initiative to implement new 
technology that will compare its user names with a registry of sex offenders in an 
attempt to protect the minors who use MySpace’s services.  Matt Richtel, MySpace.com 
Moves to Keep Sex Offenders Off of Its Website, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2006, at C3.  While 
not a foolproof strategy, MySpace has at least shown Congress that private industry can 
regulate itself. 
 52. A search for Nazi, white supremacist, or racist sites on a search engine targeted 
at the United States audience (such as http://www.yahoo.com) will yield positive results, 
whereas such a search on a French website (like http://www.yahoo.fr) will not. 
 53. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (differentiating between the 
expectation of privacy between public figures and private individuals). 
 54. In Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, an Australian citizen sued the American 
company, Dow Jones, in Australia after an allegedly defamatory article appeared on the 
Dow Jones’ subscriber-only website.  (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.).  Dow Jones 
argued that because the defamatory materials were published on servers in the United 
States, Australia lacked jurisdiction.  Id. at 579.  However, the High Court of Australia 
disagreed, holding that the moment of publication occurred when Australian users 
downloaded the materials from the server.  Id. at 587–88.  Thus, Australia had proper 
jurisdiction and the court ruled in favor of Gutnick.  The High Court further noted that it 
is the place of the legislature to reform the common law of defamation.  Id. at 600–01.  
Absent action on that front, the High Court would apply the traditional legal doctrines 
towards Internet cases.  Id. at 607; see also Michael Saadat, Jurisdiction and the Internet 
after Gutnick and Yahoo!, J. INFO. L. & TECH. (2005), available at http://www2.warwick. 
ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2005_1/saadat (considering the jurisdictional issues associated 
with the Internet, particularly with respect to defamation).  In contrast, the California 
Supreme Court recently ruled that no provider or user of an interactive computer service 
may be held liable for putting material authored by a third party on the Internet.  Barrett 
v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006).  Specifically, the court held that individual 
posters on websites, newsgroups, search engines, and blogs are protected under Section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which explicitly states that “[n]o 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”  Id. at 
522–23. 
 55. Professor Jack Goldsmith argues, “Cyberspace transactions are no different 
from ‘real-space’ transnational transactions.  They involve people in real space in one 
jurisdiction communicating with people in real space in other jurisdictions in a way that 
often does good but sometimes causes harm.”  Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1250 (1998).  However, Professor David Post emphasizes the 
counter view that the jurisdictional questions raised by the Internet have no real world 
counterpart and, as a result, traditional legal tools may not apply.  David G. Post, Against 
“Against Cyberanarchy,” 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365, 1387 (2002). 
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In instances where the public and private domains overlap, free speech 
on the Internet is generally not protected.  Employees that participate in 
forums or maintain blogs to discuss work may be fired for their posts.56  
Courts grant little recourse in such situations, even if the employee’s 
website does not discuss trade secrets but merely ridicules his boss.57  
Although unexplored in this country, a lawsuit from a fired blogger 
against his employer has surfaced in France.58  This is an area of law 
that is undergoing developmen 59
C.  Internet Regulations in Other Countries 
While the United States focused on regulations pertaining to child 
pornography and free speech, other countries focused on protecting the 
values embodied in their own cultures.  Stemming from the Nazi 
experience in World War II, French law prohibits Holocaust-denying, 
racist, Nazi-apologetic, and hate speech websites.60  Germany has similarly 
tough laws against racist, anti-Semitic, and white supremacist sites.61  
Reflecting the teachings of modesty in women in Islam, Saudi Arabia 
blocks sites considered harmful to Muslim culture and values.62  The 
 56. A number of bloggers have been fired for blogging at work.  See, e.g., 
Statistics on Fired Bloggers, http://morphemetales.wordpress.com/2006/10/09/statistics-
on-fired-bloggers (Oct. 9, 2006).  The international community has only begun to 
address this issue.  In France, a British woman who was fired for maintaining a personal 
blog at work won her case in French court.  See Bobbie Johnson, Briton Sacked for 
Writing Paris Blog Wins Tribunal Case, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 30, 2007, at 20. 
 57. Companies fear employees will inadvertently disclose trade secrets.  See, e.g., 
Vincent Chiappetta, Employee Blogs and Trade Secrets: Legal Response to Technological 
Change, 11 NEXUS: J. OPINION 31 (2006).  The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is 
a public interest law firm that champions constitutional rights in cases involving the 
Internet and provides a guide on blogger’s rights.  See How to Blog Safely (About Work 
or Anything Else) (May 31, 2005), http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Anonymity/blog-
anonymously.php. 
 58. See Angela Doland, Sacre Blog! Fired Gossip Sues in Paris, CHI. TRIB., July 
21, 2006, at 19. 
 59. An exploration of relevant domestic cases can be found in Konrad Lee, Anti-
Employer Blogging: Employee Breach of the Duty of Loyalty and the Procedure for 
Allowing Discovery of a Blogger’s Identity Before Service of Process is Effected, 2006 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 2, ¶¶ 29–42, http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/ 
2006dltr0002.html. 
 60. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 
1199, 1202–03 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 61. See Amber Jene Sayle, Net Nation and The Digital Revolution: Regulation of 
Offensive Material for a New Community, 18 WIS. INT’L L.J. 257, 268–70 (2000). 
 62. These are primarily sites with a sexual theme.  See Privacy International, 
Silenced: An International Report on Censorship and Control of the Internet, Sept. 10, 




less than democratic societies of Bahrain, China, Iran, and North Korea 
infamously censor any critique upon the ruling party.63  Democratic 
nations in areas of instability impose stricter Internet regulations in the 
name of national security.64 
D.  When Regulations Clash 
The regulations of each country conflict with each other when 
confronted by foreign websites, displaying materials legal in one country 
but illegal in another.  The ACLU court alluded to this quagmire, noting 
that foreign materials are often stored on domestic servers but domestic 
servers had no control over entering foreign content.65  Currently no 
international law defines and regulates material on the Internet.  Even in 
the realm of child pornography, an issue subject to universal disapproval, 
governments face legal difficulties capturing overseas perpetrators.66 
In the realm of free speech, Germany’s and France’s laws against 
online hate and racist speech clash with the free speech policies of the 
United States.  In the 1990s, Germany made numerous attempts to censor 
foreign neo-Nazi websites.67  These attempts included pressuring commercial 
providers to voluntarily censor material, threatening to sue foreign 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and passing laws that expressly allowed 
for the criminal prosecution of ISP executives.68  This state-sponsored 
censorship culminated in the indictment of the head of CompuServe 
Germany on charges of trafficking child pornography and failing to block 
neo-Nazi sites.69  Because CompuServe users could download pornography 
and view otherwise illegal materials on the web, prosecutors charged the 
executive with allowing users to circumvent the country’s ban on these 
2003, http://www.privacyinternational.org/survey/censorship/Silenced.pdf.  This report examines 
the state of Internet censorship in various countries throughout the world. 
 63. Id. at 47.  North Korea actually has no Internet Service Providers and only 
permits “a handful of citizens” to go online.  Id.; see Tom Zeller Jr., The Internet Black 
Hole That Is North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2006, at C3. 
 64. See Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1202–03. 
 65. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 848 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 
(1997). 
 66. Shytov, supra note 31, at 263–64. 
 67. See Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste-Gesetz—IuKDG [Information 
and Communication Services Act], June 13, 1997, BGBl I at 1120, available at 
http://bundesrecht.juris.de (amending Germany’s telecommunications law, including 
censorship provisions, to hold internet service providers responsible for material which 
appears on the Internet). 
 68. See Amber Jene Sayle, Net Nation and the Digital Revolution: Regulation of 
Offensive Material For A New Community, 18 WIS. INT’L L.J. 257, 268–69 (2000). 
 69. Id. at 271.  In the 1990s, CompuServe was a major player in the ISP industry, 
competing with AOL.  It has since been absorbed into AOL and does not operate under 
“CompuServe.”  See About CompuServe, http://webcenters.netscape.compuserve.com/menu/ 
about.jsp?floc=DCNav2 (last visited Mar. 14, 2008). 
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materials.70  The judge overturned the subsequent conviction, noting that 
the executive was “a slave of the parent company.”71 
This clash of laws emerged again in France in 2000 in a series of cases 
between Yahoo! and La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme 
(LICRA).72  Yahoo! maintains the portal www.yahoo.com for its users 
in the United States.  For its users elsewhere in the world, Yahoo! maintains 
a separate site for each country, identified by the two-letter country 
designation.  For example, a user in France would access Yahoo! France 
at fr.yahoo.com.  However, nothing prevents a user in France from 
entering www.yahoo.com and accessing content directed at United 
States citizens, just as a user living in California can access fr.yahoo.com.  
This case arose because French citizens used www.yahoo.com—aimed at 
American users—to access auctions containing Nazi memorabilia—
banned on fr.yahoo.com—in other countries.73  LICRA sued Yahoo! in 
the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (Court of Paris) alleging that 
Yahoo! violated Article R645-1 of the French Criminal Code by 
allowing French citizens access to these items through fr.yahoo.com.74 
The Court of Paris ordered Yahoo! to “take all necessary measures to 
dissuade and make impossible any access” from Yahoo.com to any other 
site that may be construed as an apology for Nazism or denial of the 
Holocaust.75  Further, the court agreed that France could prohibit 
 70. See Edmund L. Andrews, Germany Charges Compuserve Manager, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 17, 1997, at D19. 
 71. See Edmund L. Andrews, German Court Overturns Pornography Ruling 
Against Compuserve, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1999, at C4. 
 72. See Yaman Akdeniz, Case Analysis of League Against Racism and 
Antisemitism (LICRA), French Union of Jewish Students v Yahoo! Inc. (USA), Yahoo! 
France, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (The County Court of Paris), Interim 
Court Order 20 November, 2000 (2001), http://www.cyber-rights.org/documents/ 
yahoo_ya.pdf.  The original court order in French and English translations are provided 
in the Appendix to the Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre 
Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (No. C-00-
21275JF). 
 73. See Akdeniz, supra note 72. 
 74. Id.  Article R645-1 of the Penal Code prohibits the sale of any Nazi 
propaganda or artifact.  Id. 
 75. Id.  Yahoo! countered that it directed its services towards United States users, 
its servers were based in the United States, and this order would be “in contravention of 
the First Amendment . . . which guarantees freedom of opinion and expression to every 
citizen.”  Alternatively, Yahoo! argued that it could not determine the geographic 
location of every Yahoo! user.  Id. 




Yahoo!’s acceptance of the objected items and websites based on the 
“ethical and moral imperative shared by all democratic states.”76 
In January 2001, Yahoo! announced that it would ban all Nazi and Ku 
Klux Klan memorabilia from its auction site, along with any other items 
“associated with groups that promote or glorify hatred or violence.”77  
Although Yahoo! insisted it acted independently of the ruling in Paris, it 
brought Yahoo! in line with French law. 
Yahoo! returned to the United States and asked the court to declare the 
French order unenforceable in the United States.78  The court agreed, 
holding that as sovereign nations, France and the United States may 
freely make and enforce laws within their respective countries but need 
not enforce the laws of another country.79  The court stated that the 
French regulations would be inconsistent with the First Amendment if 
mandated by a court in the United States.80 
On appeal in the Ninth Circuit, the court reversed the decision, finding 
that Yahoo! failed to show an actual violation of its First Amendment 
rights.81  The Court of Paris had ordered Yahoo! to block access to Nazi 
and hateful memorabilia from French users alone.82  American users, 
however, are not targeted by this order.  In effect, Yahoo! voluntarily 
instituted a worldwide block on hate speech and references to Nazism.83  
The Ninth Circuit noted that “as to the French users, Yahoo! is 
necessarily arguing that it has a First Amendment right to violate French 
criminal law.”84 
These cases illustrate the clash between sovereign states’ interests in 
protecting the values important to their citizens and the free-flowing 
democratic nature of the Internet: no country willingly relinquishes its 
borders.  Further, international regulation as to issues concerning 
extraterritoriality and the ill-defined boundaries of the Internet do not 
exist.85  As a result, a company could comply with the laws in its home 
country, violate the laws in another, and be asked by its home country’s 
court to censor materials around the world. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Yahoo! Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1185. 
 78. Id. at 1181. 
 79. Id. at 1194. 
 80. Id. at 1192. 
 81. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 
1199, 1224 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 82. Yahoo! Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1184. 
 83. See Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1223. 
 84. Id. at 1221. 
 85. However, legal options in the international Internet commerce (e-commerce) 
setting do exist.  See Taipo Puurunen, The Judicial Jurisdiction of States Over International 
Business-to-Consumer Electronic Commerce from the Perspective of Legal Certainty, 8 
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 133 (2002). 
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E.  The China Problem   
To some extent, every country censors the Internet.86  Even in the 
United States, a search for “Kazaa”87 on Google.com used to return a 
notice informing users that certain search results had been removed in 
order to comply with Kazaa’s lawsuit against Google pursuant to the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).88  However, China has 
emerged as the main offender in Internet censorship due to its broad 
censorship of any “unhappy information” and its harsh consequences for 
those who violate its censorship laws.89  Further, while users in democratic 
countries may have the resources to circumvent the censorship laws of 
their country, China and its authoritarian government successfully capture 
and punish many who violate its censorship laws. 
The introduction of the Internet in China granted its citizens a level of 
freedom of communication that the government did not anticipate.  
Realizing the potential for political upheavals, China passed a complicated 
and intertwined set of regulations directed at ISPs and citizens alike for 
the purpose of locating and removing dissidents.90  In 2000, China’s 
 86. Chilling Effects is a website maintained by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.  
It lists official government notices from various countries ordering material removed 
from the Internet to comply with that country’s laws.  The majority of complaints request 
Google to remove websites posting materials that violate the DMCA.  See Chilling 
Effects, http://www.chillingeffects.org/internation/notice.cgi (last visited Mar. 14, 2008). 
 87. In early 2000, Kazaa emerged as a peer-to-peer file sharing network allowing 
users to download copyrighted materials free of charge.  See Press Release, Sharman 
Networks, Content Industries and Sharman Networks Settle All Global Litigation (July 
27, 2006), available at http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=176141.  Kazaa 
subsequently became the target of copyright infringement lawsuits but settled its cases in 
2006.  Kazaa Site Becomes Legal Service, BBC NEWS, July 27, 2006, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/5220406.stm. 
 88. The search of “Kazaa” on Google.com returns the result: “In response to a 
complaint we received under the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act, we have 
removed (8) result(s) from this page.  If you wish, you may read the DMCA complaint 
for these removed results.”  Declan McCullagh, Google Pulls Links to Kazaa Imitator, 
CNET NEWS, Sept. 2, 2003, http://www.news.com/2100-1032_3-5070227.html. 
 89. For a history of Chinese Internet regulations and the reasoning behind the 
regulations, see Charles Li, Internet Content Control in China, 8 INT’L J. COMM. L. & 
POL’Y 1 (2003). 
 90. See Greg Walton, China’s Golden Shield: Corporations and the Development 
of Surveillance Technology in the People’s Republic of China, RIGHTS & DEMOCRACY, 
2001, http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/globalization/goldenShieldEng.html 
(exploring current and future Internet regulations in China, including electronic 
surveillance and censorship).  According to the United States Department of State, China 
is also planning to implement an “email filtration system” that can track and monitor 




Ministry of Public Service launched the Golden Shield project, aimed at 
promoting “the adoption of advanced information and communication 
technology to strengthen central police control, responsiveness, and 
crime combating capacity to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
police work.”91  The Golden Shield encapsulates these regulations.  It 
envisions the Internet as a mass surveillance tool, promising immediate 
Internet access to its citizens and increased police security in exchange 
for the ability to monitor every citizen.92  To date, the Golden Shield project 
allows the Chinese government to track up to 162 million Chinese 
Internet users.93  Apart from legal regulations, China also censors the 
Internet through technology, as evidenced on September 3, 2002.  On 
that date China blocked all access to Google, a popular search engine.94  
In the same way users of Yahoo! France could access materials aimed at 
American users yet banned in France through Yahoo!, Chinese users of 
Google could access information about banned topics through sites 
based in other countries.95  However, because the search engines had no 
physical offices inside China, China lacked legal authority to charge 
these search engines with violations of Chinese law.96  To prevent its 
citizens from accessing illegal materials, China simply blocked the search 
engines.97  Fortunately, China eventually lifted this block as a result of 
heavy global opposition to this new policy.98 
individual email accounts.  U.S. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 
U.S. DEPT OF STATE, 1999 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES—CHINA 
(2000), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/ 
china.html [hereinafter U.S. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY]. 
 91. Walton, supra note 90.  The Golden Shield is a collection of regulations, 
divided in many stages, aimed at allowing China instant access to the registration of 
records of each citizen.  Leaders also envision cameras at every intersection to improve 
police response time but also to aid in electronic surveillance of its citizens.  Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. China’s state network information center, China Internet Network Information 
Center (CNNIC), released its 2007 survey of Chinese Internet use.  The CNNIC found 
over thirty-seven million rural users and approximately 125 million urban users.  Thus, 
the Golden shield has the potential of monitoring over 162 million citizens.  See CNNIC, 
STATISTICAL SURVEY REPORT ON THE INTERNET DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA (2007), 
http://cnnic.cn/download/2007/20thCNNICreport-en.pdf.  China installed “black boxes” 
on Chinese Internet service providers to monitor activity within individual email 
accounts.  China also plans on developing technology that can detect and delete 
“unwanted” emails without the recipient’s knowledge or consent.  U.S. BUREAU OF 
DEMOCRACY, supra note 90. 
 94. Thompson, supra note 29, at 67–68. 
 95. Banned topics included any reference to Tiananmen Square, Tibet independence, 
and the Falun Gong, a group China considers a religious cult.  Id. at 66, 68. 
 96. Id. at 68. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 71.  In Who Controls the Internet?, Professors Jack Goldsmith and Tim 
Wu argue that the effect of global influence on Chinese telecommunications and security 
policy may be greatly exaggerated or misinterpreted by Western media.  JACK GOLDSMITH & 
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Despite this retreat, the since dubbed “Great Firewall of China”99 has 
continually adapted to rapidly changing technology; each new attempt to 
circumvent the wall is met with equally dedicated programmers on 
China’s side denying access.100  The firewall operates on multiple levels 
of filtration, based on a blacklist of sites and filtered words, as well as 
filtration based on the originating location and final destination of 
incoming information.101  Certain sites that are either difficult to filter or 
contain large amounts of user-created personal content are blocked 
completely.102  Further, China’s censorship lacks transparency because 
the government does not distribute a list of censored topics, nor does the 
government even admit to censorship efforts.103  Thus, China has 
introduced an element of psychological pressure on its citizens to censor 
themselves as they deem appropriate.  Of course, a citizen who violates 
the vague censorship laws faces legal penalties and perha
The Chinese realize that their government enforces its censorship laws 
through the physical punishment of citizens who use the Internet for 
disapproved purposes.  According to Amnesty International, China has 
imprisoned at least fifty-four citizens for wrongful Internet activity under 
the country’s broad interpretation of its Golden Shield regulations.104 
TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 89 (2006).  
In fact, China blocks and filters only what it deems fit.  Id.  As a result, a “government’s 
failure to crack down on certain types of Internet communication ultimately reflects a 
failure of interest or will, not a failure of power.”  Id. 
 99. The phrase “Great Firewall of China” first appeared as the title of an article in 
WIRED magazine, bringing public attention to Chinese Internet censorship.  See Geremie 
R. Barme & Sang Ye, The Great Firewall of China, WIRED, June 1997, available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/5.06/china.html. 
 100. OpenNet Initiative provides a very technological examination of China’s 
Internet censorship capabilities.  OpenNet Initiative, Internet Filtering in China in 2004–
2005, http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/china/ONI_China_Country_Study.pdf.  OpenNet 
Initiative is a collaborative partnership between three universities which address the 
increased regional control of the Internet.  For a list of banned topics and blacklisted 
sites, see Thompson, supra note 29, at 68. 
 101. Thompson, supra note 29, at 68. 
 102. An example includes the user-created online encyclopedia Wikipedia.  Id. at 
156.  Recently, China relaxed its ban on the English version of Wikipedia.  The Chinese 
version remains inaccessible.  Noam Cohen, Chinese Government Relaxes Its Total Ban 
on Wikipedia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006, at C6. 
 103. OpenNet Initiative, supra note 100, at 52. 
 104. According to Amnesty International, China also has the largest recorded 
number of imprisoned journalists and cyber-dissidents in the world.  Furthermore, those 
in prison, like Shi Tao, are reportedly forced to work in harsh conditions and their 
relatives are questioned daily by police.  See Amnesty International, Undermining 




In April 2005, Chinese journalist Shi Tao received a sentence of ten 
years in prison for an email he authored summarizing a meeting on state 
propaganda.105  The case garnered worldwide attention because an American 
corporation, Yahoo!, facilitated Shi Tao’s arrest.106  Because he sent the 
email from his Yahoo! account, China requested, and Yahoo! Hong 
Kong delivered, information on Shi Tao’s location.107  Before this incident, 
prominent United States companies had always provided the technology 
behind China’s Golden Shield.108  These companies had also long complied 
with the censorship laws of the particular country.109  However, this was 
the first instance in which a United States company’s voluntary 
compliance with censorship law led directly to the imprisonment of a 
citizen whose only crime was the exercise of free speech. 
In January 2006, attention turned from Yahoo! to Google when 
Google announced a second version of its search engine specifically for 
Chinese citizens.110  Located at Google.cn, this search engine would 
fully comply with China’s censorship laws, erasing links to all sites on 
the Falun Gong, Tiananmen Square, and anything else banned by the 
government.111  Previously, no one nation, business, or person could control 
the Internet.  With Google’s help, China solved this conundrum by creating 
a second Internet, a Chinese Internet, which lies completely within Chinese 
control.112  Notably, unlike other regimes mentioned before, China is not 
trying to censor the Internet by blocking technological progress.  Instead it 
seeks to build and control a technologically advanced, highly sophisticated 
Freedom of Expression in China 15–16, July 2006, http://web.amnesty.org/library/ 
Index/ENGPOL300262006. 
 105. Id at 15.  For general technology-related human rights violations in China, 
such as jailing citizens who use the Internet to voice criticism at the government, see 
Human Rights in China, http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/category?cid=8535 
(last visited Mar. 14, 2008). 
 106. Amnesty International, supra note 104, at 15. 
 107. Id.  China’s Golden Shield laws do not apply to Hong Kong or Macau; as 
special administrative regions they operate under their own respective legal systems.  See 
Keith Bradsher, Chinese Provinces Form Regional Economic Bloc, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 
2004, at W7 (“Hong Kong and Macau have been special administrative regions of China 
since Britain handed over Hong Kong in 1997 and Portugal returned Macau in 1999.”). 
 108. These companies include Cisco Systems and Nortel Networks for hardware, 
Microsoft for software, and Google and Yahoo! for search engine capabilities.  See 
Thompson, supra note 29, at 155; see also Walton, supra note 90. 
 109. Yahoo! changed its policies to comply with French law.  Akdeniz, supra note 
72, at 4. 
 110. Thompson, supra note 29, at 154–55. 
 111. Id. at 86, 154. 
 112. While Google operationally controls the actual search engine, China through 
its firewall controls the output of that search engine.  Furthermore, many saw this second 
search engine, Google.cn, as a renunciation of Google’s motto of “do no evil,” because 
the corporation chose to profit at the expense of human expression in a country notorious 
for its human rights violations.  Id. at 155. 
SHYU POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC 4/22/2008  1:33:43 PM 
[VOL. 45:  211, 2008]  Speak No Evil 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 229 
 
second Internet.  The emergence of this second Internet, coupled with 
the inextricable role of American corporations in providing China with 
the infrastructure to restrict Internet access, motivated Congress to call 
the executives into that infamous hearing in February 2006. 
III.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A.   Global Online Freedom Act113 
On February 16, 2006, after the acrimonious hearing in the House of 
Representatives, Representative Christopher Smith (R-NJ) introduced 
the Global Online Freedom Act of 2006.  While that bill never became 
law, it was reintroduced in similar form on January 5, 2007 as the Global 
Online Freedom Act of 2007 (Act).114  This Act aims to “promote 
freedom of expression on the Internet [and] to protect United States 
businesses from coercion to participate in repression by authoritarian 
foreign governments . . . .”115  The Act hopes to accomplish this goal 
through: (1) promoting global internet freedom; (2) creating minimum 
corporate standards for online freedom; and (3) establishing export 
controls for Internet-restrictive countries.116  Secretary of State 
 113. The Global Online Freedom Act is not an original creation.  On January 7, 
2003, Christopher Cox (R-Cal.) and Tom Lantos (D-Cal.), among others, introduced the 
Global Internet Freedom Act.  See H.R. 48, 108th Cong. (2003), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:H.R.48:.  Although identical in purpose to 
this Act, it would accomplish the goals through consultation with the United Nations and 
by funding technologies aimed at concealing a user’s physical location.  H.R. 48, 108th 
Cong. § 5(2)–(3).  Analysis of the Global Internet Freedom Act is provided by Elaine M. 
Chen, Global Online Internet Freedom: Can Censorship and Freedom Co-Exist, 13 
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 229 (2003).  This bill was reintroduced in similar form on 
February 14, 2006.  See H.R. 4741, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 114. See Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. (2006); 
Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. (as reported by H. Comm. 
on Foreign Affairs on Dec. 10, 2007). 
 115. H.R. 275.  Other purposes include promoting the free flow of information and 
deterring United States businesses “from cooperating with officials of Internet-restricting 
countries in effecting the political censorship of online content.”  Id. § 101(2)–(3). 
 116. See id. §§ 101(2), 104(b)(6).  As part of the bill, Congress also makes the 
following findings: 
Authoritarian foreign governments such as the Governments of Belarus,  Cuba, 
Ethiopia, Iran, Laos, North Korea, the People’s Republic of China, Tunisia, 
and Vietnam, among others, block, restrict, and monitor the information their 
citizens try to obtain. . . . Technology companies in the United States that 
operate in countries controlled by authoritarian foreign governments have a 
moral responsibility to comply with the principles of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. . . . Technology companies in the United States have 




Condoleezza Rice has already established the Office of Global Internet 
Freedom, which will oversee implementation of the Act and set policy.117 
Under the Act, the President shall designate Internet-restrictive 
countries each year.118  United States businesses cannot locate, within a 
designated Internet-restricting country, any electronic communication 
containing personally identifiable information, nor process or store such 
information by remote computing service facilities.119  Further, the businesses 
cannot alter the operation of their search engines at the request of the 
foreign officials of any Internet-restricting country.120  Information on 
communications with foreign officials, concerning censorship or terms 
to filter, must be turned over to the Office of Global Internet Freedom.121  
Any business that violates the provisions of this bill faces civil and 
criminal penalties.122 
At present, few obstacles stand in the way of the Act’s passage.  The 
Act holds bipartisan support and numerous human rights organizations 
have endorsed its passage.123  In particular, Amnesty International launched 
an official website with the purpose of supporting and promoting the 
Act.124  Furthermore, the anticipated rise of China as an economic 
power, coupled with China’s often antidemocratic policies, create the 
perfect political environment for anti-China legislation.125 
provided technology and training to authoritarian foreign governments which 
have been used by such governments in filtering and blocking information 
that promotes democracy and freedom.   
Id. § 2(5), (11), (13). 
 117. See Press Release, United States Department of State, Secretary of State 
Establishes New Global Internet Freedom Task Force (Feb. 14, 2006), available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/61156.htm. 
 118. H.R. 275 § 105(a)(1)–(2).  The Act provides no specific criteria in determining 
which countries qualify as Internet-restrictive. 
 119. Id. § 201. 
 120. Id. § 202(a). 
 121. Id. §§ 203, 204. 
 122. Id. § 206.  Monetary penalties range between $10,000 to $2,000,000 depending 
on the extent of the violation, and criminal penalties include imprisonment of up to five 
years.  Id. 
 123. As of January 27, 2008, four Republican and four Democratic congressmen 
have cosponsored the bill with Congressman Smith (R-NJ).  Library of Congress, 
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:H.R.275: (last visited Mar. 14, 
2008). 
 124. See Irrepressible, http://irrepressible.info (last visited Mar. 14, 2008).  Users 
may download briefings on Internet repression on China and join a campaign against 
general Internet repression. 
 125. American corporations outsource labor to China because they can pay Chinese 
workers less than American workers and do not need to abide by stringent American 
labor laws.  However, this has caused a backlash in the United States and has created a 
negative sentiment towards China as more and more jobs disappear overseas.  See Matt 
Richtel, Outsourced All the Way, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2005, at C1; Steven Greenhouse, As 
Factory Jobs Disappear, Ohio Town Has Few Options, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2003, at A1. 
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Despite the Act’s overwhelming support, some concerns remain:      
(1) whether this oversight by the United States State Department will 
cause Chinese citizens to distrust American corporations; (2) whether 
Congress should redefine the very way American corporations function 
abroad, that is, by forcing United States companies to move all Internet-
related hardware out of Internet-restrictive countries; and (3) whether the 
United States should unilaterally set global Internet law.126 
The first concern, whether Chinese citizens will distrust American 
corporations, arises from the Act’s requirement that all communications 
by foreign officials discussing terms subject to filtering and censorship 
be delivered to the U.S. State Department.127  In addition, even though 
United States companies must store personally identifiable information 
outside China, they nonetheless continue to have unlimited access to 
Chinese user information.  Section 203 thus casts all American Internet 
companies operating in China as potential spies.   
The Act also further strengthens the positions of Chinese companies.  
First, the Act cannot apply to Chinese companies because Chinese 
companies follow Chinese, not American, law.  In fact, Chinese companies 
will comply with Chinese censorship law.  Second, Chinese citizens do 
not lack technological alternatives.  China’s Baidu.com, another search 
engine, has a fifty-eight percent market share in China, compared to 
Google’s twenty-three percent.128  If Chinese users discover that American 
companies such as Google may disclose personal, private information to 
a foreign government, citizens will choose Chinese companies and 
censorship will prosper as such companies will fully comply with 
censorship laws. 
The second critique of the Act focuses on the requirement that 
American companies not process or store personally identifiable information 
within Internet-restrictive countries, possibly resulting in the movement 
 126. To even address these concerns, we must first assume Chinese citizens will 
continue to use American search engines after the Act passes and the Chinese public 
becomes aware of its implications. 
 127. H.R. 275 § 203. 
 128. Loretta Chao, China’s Baidu, Sky High, Still Rates ‘Buy’: Even as Price, 
Competition Soar, Popular Web Site is an Analyst Favorite, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2007, 
at C3.  American search engines are not the only companies with Chinese competitors: 
China’s Huawei is the country’s equivalent to Cisco Systems or Nortel Networks in 
Internet hardware production.  In fact, Cisco sued Huawei for copyright infringement.  
Press Release, Cisco Systems Inc., Cisco Files Lawsuit Against Huawei Technologies 
(Jan. 23, 2003), available at http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/corp_012303.html. 




of all Internet-related-hardware outside the borders of such countries.129  
This provision may alter the way the majority of American companies 
operate overseas in the affected countries, by forcing the companies to 
not house servers in those countries.   
The greatest criticism of the Act questions whether the United States 
government should set Internet law worldwide.  The Act runs straight 
into the black hole of international jurisdiction.  No law dictates the 
enforcement of foreign judgments, much less resolves conflict between 
differing Internet regulations.  By passing the Act, or an act with similar 
provisions, the United States draws first blood in this battle.  Disregarding 
the barriers of sovereignty, the Act allows the United States to control 
businesses operating in another country.  Closer to home, it is akin to a 
California state law applying in Nevada to Nevada citizens. 
In addition, the drafters of the Act focused on the situation in China 
but neglected to examine the long-term global consequences of the Act.  
Even assuming the Act halts the censorship and persecution of dissident 
activists in China, with this precedent, European countries could pass 
equally intrusive laws aimed at the American subsidiaries of French 
companies.  For example, as a result of precedent set by the Act, French 
law could force French companies operating in America to turn over 
information on all users who enter neo-Nazi search terms. 
Aside from these criticisms, the Act also presents two pressing issues: 
(1) the plight of Chinese Internet users; and (2) the lack of international 
Internet regulations.  In the absence of fruitful international action, the 
United States should take a leadership role and propel the discussion on 
resolving these problems.  Perhaps the best way to initiate this discussion is 
by passing and enforcing an act that forces these issues upon the 
international community.  Although unilateral action would certainly 
raise the importance of crafting lasting solutions to these issues, this 
action alone does not provide an immediate solution to a problem that 
affects Chinese citizens today.  For that reason, independent of the 
passage of the Act, the United States should implement other short-term 
solutions. 
B.  No Public Regulation 
Most simply, the United States can ignore China’s use of American 
corporations to administer state-sponsored censorship and dispose of any 
 129. H.R. 275 § 201.  In contrast to the Act, the Department of Justice and the FBI 
have contemplated rewriting United States wiretapping rules to require foreign ISPs to 
place within United States borders all servers used for United States customers.  See 
Grant Gross, FBI Floats Wide-Ranging Wiretap Proposal, INFOWORLD, Sept. 14, 2006, 
http://www.infoworld.com/article/06/09/14/HNfbiwiretap_1.html. 
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plan of global Internet regulation.  This choice to trust the Internet itself, 
market forces, or the judiciary to come up with the “right solution” is 
much less radical but much more complicated than it appears at first 
glance. 
Even with China’s stiff regulations, the mere presence of the Internet 
in China expanded free speech opportunities for Chinese citizens.130  For 
example, message boards allow Chinese citizens to express their anger 
over their government’s slow response to notify residents of harmful 
contaminants in their drinking water.131  Further, as long as the ordinary 
citizen does not organize political protests, that citizen may chat, blog, 
and even conduct business with strangers.132  Thus, even with the restrictions 
they face, as a result of the Internet’s presence, Chinese citizens receive 
information from the outside world and communicate with each other 
more easily. 
Moreover, the Chinese government lacks absolute control of information 
because the Great Firewall, while complex in nature, has sprung leaks.  
China does not employ citizens to surf the Internet and manually remove 
websites.  Rather, China relies on intricate filtering technology as well as 
secrecy so that even Chinese companies must speculate as to which sites 
are banned.133  The technologically sophisticated may code their way 
past the firewall—that is, until China’s programmers counter by patching 
these holes.  In addition, where the technology fails, information can bypass 
the censors.134  Unfortunately, users cannot predict which websites 
pierce the firewall.  However, relying on these leaks, supporters of 
nonregulation believe that although some content would be filtered, 
enough information would enter the country to enlighten the citizens and 
bring democracy.135  Further, if a Chinese citizen accesses unfiltered 
 130. See discussion supra Part II.E. 
 131. In late 2005, benzene spilled into the Songhua river in China.  The citizens of 
Harbin, a city in China, noticed the spill and the foul odor in their water supply, but the 
local papers and city officials professed ignorance of the situation.  See Jim Yardley, 
Spill in China Brings Danger, Cover-Up and Wild Rumors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2005, 
at A1. 
 132. See Thompson, supra note 29, at 71, 155. 
 133. China can rely on “self-censorship” by companies because any misstep a 
company may make will result in legal penalties or infliction of physical punishment.  
See supra notes 89–100, 104–06, and accompanying text. 
 134. Some domain names are accessible while the URLs to those domains are 
blocked.  See supra note 100. 
 135. For instance, former President Bill Clinton once stated in a speech on 
international relations, “We know how much the Internet has changed America, and we 
are already an open society.  Imagine how it could change China.  Now there’s no 




material before the firewall catches this material, nothing stops this 
citizen from distributing this material via cell phone or text message to 
other concerned citizens.136 
In addition, modern day Chinese citizens appear aware but indifferent 
to their country’s Internet censorship.137  One scholar in China has noted 
that most users can work, travel, speak privately, and surf online with 
relative freedom, so that censorship itself does not disrupt daily life.138  
Citizens interviewed by the New York Times after the Google firewall 
incident professed knowledge of the censorship but adopted a long-term 
perspective, believing the government would ultimately fail in censoring 
the Internet.139  Another Chinese citizen shared the belief of early scholars 
worldwide that the Internet by itself plants the seeds for democracy in 
Chinese youth.140  For the ordinary Chinese citizen, Internet censorship 
may not be so bothersome, as compared to the burdens of everyday life, 
to inspire activism.141 
Although opting for no regulation is an easy and tempting path to take, 
unfortunately China has neither relented nor shown signs of relenting in 
its quest to restrict Internet access.  China’s attempt at Internet regulation 
cannot be compared to the failed attempts of France and Germany.  In 
fact, as evidenced by the fate of Shi Tao, China’s firewall has proven 
more sophisticated, its police force more brutal, and its rules more 
stringent than ever anticipated.  Beyond the lives at stake lies the possibility 
that China will completely control its Internet one day, blocking all 
outside access from its citizens.  As a result, the Internet cannot be 
entrusted to bring democracy to China on its own. 
The Internet has also failed to bring democracy to China through 
market forces.  Google chose to stay in China and comply with its 
censorship laws to maintain a foothold in an immense potential market.  
This is a choice echoed by non-Internet companies: to outsource 
question China has been trying to crack down on the Internet—good luck. . . .  That’s 
sort of like trying to nail Jello to the wall.”  Bill Clinton, Address at the Paul H. Nitze 
School for Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins University (March 8, 2000) 
(transcript available at http://canberra.usembassy.gov/hyper/2000/0308/epf302.htm). 
 136. Chinese citizens are increasingly using cell phone text messaging as a way of 
passing information quickly, organizing protests, and bypassing censors.  See Jim 
Yardley, A Hundred Cellphones Bloom, And Chinese Take to the Streets, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 25, 2005, at A1. 
 137. The PBS documentary series Frontline has explored China’s censorship of its 
political activists on the Internet and in print media.  This particular episode contains 
extensive interviews comparing Western views of China’s censorship with opinions by 
Chinese scholars.  Frontline: The Tankman (PBS television broadcast Apr. 11, 2006) 
(transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tankman). 
 138. Li, supra note 89, at 37. 
 139. See Thompson, supra note 29, at 156. 
 140. Id. at 66, 156. 
 141. Id. at 156. 
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manufacturing and service-oriented labor to China in the name of profit 
and the promotion of shareholder value.  As the largest potential customer 
base in the world, market forces direct companies toward China, and 
China requires the companies to comply with its laws.142 
Finally, if the United States government does not regulate the Internet, 
the judiciary may develop common law to address the different situations.  
However, as Justice Benjamin Cardozo so aptly put it: 
We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong 
because we deal with it otherwise at home.  The courts are not free to refuse to 
enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion 
of expediency or fairness.  They do not close their doors, unless help would 
violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of 
good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.143 
A court will not apply foreign law if it violates a fundamental principle of 
domestic public policy.144  In the United States, these fundamental 
principles correspond to the values articulated in our Puritanical roots.  
In other countries, these fundamental principles reflect different values 
accorded by each culture.  As a result, even if the judiciary develops 
common law to address corporate responsibility for Internet censorship 
abroad, other countries need to apply these laws.145  This solution also 
runs into old issues of United States imperialism and reopens grudges 
between the Old World, New World, and developing countries. 
C.  Corporate Accountability 
Responsibility for Internet regulation in China starts with the offending 
corporations themselves.  Those persons or entities that hold an American 
corporation accountable can direct the corporation to change its policies 
in China.  Accountability exists when an agent is held to answer for 
 142. In 2005, China held the top spot in the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Confidence Index for the third year in a row.  GLOBAL BUSINESS POLICY COUNCIL, FDI 
CONFIDENCE INDEX (2005), http://www.atkearney.com/shared_res/pdf/FDICI_2005.pdf.  
The FDI measures long-term investments by a foreign entity into another country’s 
economy.  It represents investor confidence in the economy of any given country.  In the 
FDI index, India and the United States held second and third place, respectively.  Id. at 
1–2. 
 143. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201–02 (N.Y. 1918). 
 144. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Disaggregated Sovereignty, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 35, 53–54 (David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi 
eds., 2005). 
 145. See id. (discussing the “principle of legitimate differences”). 




performance that involves some delegation of authority to act.146  In that 
sense, a corporation’s owners, its institutional and individual shareholders, 
can direct corporate policy because owners are principals and officers 
are agents of the corporation.  But corporations in the United States must 
also answer to those to whom they are indebted, such as their creditors 
and customers.  Finally, corporations are internally accountable to their 
employees and externally accountable to any business entities with 
which they have a working relationship, such as distributors and 
suppliers.147  One of the primary goals of a corporation is to increase 
shareholder wealth by raising the price of the company’s stock so that 
any actions with a deleterious effect on the current or projected stock 
price of a company will motivate the company to take action. 
Shareholders may hold a corporation accountable for its actions by 
taking action to deter the corporation from engaging in the discouraged 
activity.  Most recently, as a result of Enron, Worldcom, and other scandals 
involving elaborately falsified financial statements, shareholders demanded, 
and Congress responded by imposing new regulations on all public 
companies.148  In addition, institutional shareholders may use their substantial 
voting power and leverage over a company’s share price to influence the 
board of directors of an offending corporation.149  Although individual 
 146. Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Transnational Corporations and Public Accountability, 
in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 144, at 110, 112. 
 147. See id. at 113–14. 
 148. In 2001, American energy giant Enron revealed that it had sustained its profits 
as a result of massive internal accounting fraud.  Enron subsequently filed the second 
largest United States claim for bankruptcy in history.  Richard A. Oppel, Jr., & Andrew 
Ross Sorkin, Enron Corp. Files Largest U.S. Claim for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 
2001, at A1.  Thousands of employees lost not only their jobs but also their savings in 
the now worthless Enron stock.  See Kate Murphy, Enron’s Collapse: The Employees 
Sent Home To Sit and Wait By the Phone, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at C9.  The ensuing 
investigation pointed fingers straight at Enron’s auditors.  See Alex Berenson, Enron’s 
Collapse: Watching The Firms That Watch The Books, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2001, at C1.  
After the American telecommunications company Worldcom revealed that it also 
engaged in deceptive accounting practices and then declared the largest United States 
claim for bankruptcy in history, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to promote 
corporate governance and accountability.  Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, Worldcom 
Files for Bankruptcy; Largest U.S. Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at A1; see Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information Order of 
Sarbanes-Oxley 3–5, 10–16 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Legal and Econ. Studies, 
Working Paper No. 216, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=391363 (discussing 
implications of Sarbanes-Oxley on future Enron-like situations). 
 149. California’s public pension fund, CalPERS, has “long sought ways to use the 
power of its holdings to influence corporate behavior.  Its trustees have argued that doing 
so is a crucial part of their fiduciary duty, because insisting on good corporate 
governance is likely to bring about more valuable shares.”  Mary Williams Walsh, 
Calpers Ouster Puts Focus On How Funds Wield Power, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at 
C10.  In the 2004 election, however, CalPERS’s Democratic trustees came under attack 
by Republicans, who claimed CalPERS puts social responsibility ahead of shareholder 
value.  Id. 
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shareholders have little clout as compared to institutional investors, these 
shareholders can destroy a company’s reputation in the media.150  In 
addition, individual shareholders may punish corporations through the 
judicial system in shareholder lawsuits.151  Finally, the individual 
shareholders can simply sell off the
Thus, the power to change the policies of these Internet companies lies 
in the hands of their shareholders and business partners.  To date, this 
has not occurred—the stakeholders seem content with the direction these 
companies have chosen.152  Not surprisingly, shareholders enjoy having 
a foothold in an immense potential economic market.153 
 150. Corporations are finding it increasingly difficult to hide labor violations in 
foreign countries from the American public.  See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social 
Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 736–37 
(2002). 
 151. Several law review articles explore the possibility of shareholders holding 
corporations responsible for human rights violations under the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(ATCA).  See Francisco Rivera, A Response to the Corporate Campaign Against the 
Alien Tort Claims Act, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 251, 276–77 (2003) 
(acknowledging weaknesses to the ATCA approach but chastising corporations for 
attacking the ATCA when no other better remedy exists and when corporations 
themselves do not engage in corporate responsibilities); Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing 
Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for Violating International Law, 4 UCLA J. INT’L 
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 81, 104–14 (1999) (applying the ATCA and justifying its use against 
corporations engaged in human rights abuses); Beth Van Schaack, With All Deliberate 
Speed: Civil Human Rights Litigation as a Tool For Social Change, 57 VAND. L. REV. 
2305, 2345–47 (2004) (cautioning against potential backlash in ATCA lawsuits that may 
result in a focus on litigation at the cost of forgetting the victims). 
 152. The tide may slowly be turning.  Institutional shareholder Boston Common 
Asset Management recently introduced a shareholder resolution requiring Cisco Systems 
to specify the steps taken by the company to reduce the likelihood that its practices in 
China may enable or encourage the violation of human rights.  See Press Release, Boston 
Common Asset Management, LLC, Human Rights and Internet Fragmentation Proposal 
Receives Record Shareholder Support (Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://www.boston 
commonasset.com/news/cisco-agm-111506.html.  The resolution failed, but twenty-nine 
percent of Cisco’s shareholders voted in its favor, up from eleven percent the year before 
when the investment firm introduced the same resolution.  Id.  The shareholders voted 
for the resolution despite vehement opposition by Cisco’s board, which includes Jerry 
Yang, the president of Yahoo!.  Press Release, Reporters Without Borders, Shareholders 
Ask Cisco Systems to Account for its Activities in Repressive Countries (Nov. 17, 
2006), available at http://www.rsf.org/article. php3?id_article=19782.  In addition, the 
New York City Pension Fund has targeted the shareholders of Google, Yahoo!, and 
Microsoft with similar resolutions.  The city’s pension fund has considerable financial 
clout, owning nearly 400 million dollars worth of stock in the two companies.  The 
Yahoo! resolution received more than 15% of shareholder votes, with the Google and 
Microsoft resolutions receiving 3.8% and 3.9% respectively.  Press Release, William C. 
Thompson, Jr., N.Y. City Comptroller, Thompson Pressures Yahoo! and Google to Establish 
Policies Against Censorship (Jan. 31, 2008), available at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/press/ 




Despite the reluctance of institutional shareholders to promote the 
advancement of human rights, the general public can also hold corporations 
accountable for their actions.154  Because corporations touch so many 
facets of society and because of their visibility in the public in general, 
society has often called upon corporations to redefine the status quo.  
For example, public groups have petitioned corporations to protect 
workers’ rights, conform to environmental safety standards, and promote 
the advancement of women and minorities in the workplace.155  Watchdog 
organizations can also harm a company’s reputation and, in some cases, 
affect that company’s practices overseas.156 
If Chinese and American corporations refuse to act to change the 
status quo, the American and Chinese public may force these corporations 
to take responsibility for their actions.157  Already, news of Internet 
censorship in the United States caused the legislature to initiate the 
2008_releases/pr08-01-009.shtm.  In January 2008, New York City Comptroller William 
C. Thompson Jr. resubmitted the Yahoo! and Google resolutions on behalf of the fund.  
Id. 
 153. Shareholder sentiment with regard to a specific element of corporate 
philosophy may be difficult to quantify.  Just as a citizen will vote for the election 
candidate that best represents that citizen’s views, a shareholder will not oust the board 
of directors if he or she disagrees with a part but not all of the of board’s philosophies. 
 154. Koenig-Archibugi, supra note 146, at 112. 
 155. Williams, supra note 150, at 736–40 (noting that after a negative publicity 
campaign aimed at Nike’s labor practices, Nike has since become the picture of social 
responsibility); see also Danny Hakim, Bicoastal Blues For G.M. and Ford, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 23, 2005, at C1 (“[T]he electoral party of [the ten states adopting California’s car 
emission standards] . . . puts considerable pressure on automakers to develop more fuel-
efficient vehicles.”). 
 156. Even if an organization makes a wholly ridiculous claim against a corporation, 
each accusation slowly erodes the company’s goodwill and adversely affects its stock 
prices.  Corporations may heed shareholders’ concerns over a decreasing or stagnant 
stock price because the directive of a corporation is to increase shareholder value.  For 
example, constant criticism over Wal-Mart’s alleged choice of profits at the cost of 
exploiting low-income workers has resulted in a stagnant stock price in recent years, 
despite steadily increasing sales and profits.  As a result, Wal-Mart now must examine its 
corporate image.  See Liza Featherstone, Wal-Mart’s P.R. War, SALON, Aug. 2, 2005, 
http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2005/08/02/walmart/index.html?pn=1 (distinguishing 
the anti-Wal-Mart movement from other public outcries for corporate responsibilities, in 
part because activists equate fighting Wal-Mart with opposing the current President and 
also because of the willingness of the activists to engage politicians and pass legislation 
against Wal-Mart); WAL-MART STORES INC., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2005) (noting 
frustration on the part of Rob Walton, Chairman of the Board of Directors: “It is 
frustrating that over the last five years, our sales have gone up almost 83 percent, and our 
earnings have grown almost 100 percent, but our stock price hasn’t moved.”). 
 157. Some publicly-traded Chinese companies are actually partially owned by the 
state.  For example, the Chinese government partially owns Baidu and Sina.net.  Consequently, 
if these companies succeed to Google’s share of the Chinese market, effective shareholder 
oversight may be impossible to obtain. 
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Global Online Freedom Act.158  The media and public interest groups 
such as Amnesty International now broadcast what they perceive to be 
the wrongs of these companies on national news and on the front of 
pages of prominent newspapers.159  This erosion of the reputation of these 
companies and the call for accountability overseas by public interest groups 
and by the media has begun.  And if such erosion depresses the stock 
prices of these companies, it will not be forgotten.  Google’s loud 
proclamations of philanthropy and its do-no-evil motto make it a 
particularly vulnerable target.160  Although the Google Foundation funds 
research into environmentally friendly hybrid car engines, promotes 
literacy, and fights poverty, it does nothing to aid the human rights 
situation in China despite the situation’s close ties to Google’s overseas 
operations.161  As a result, public groups should focus on Google’s ability to 
remedy the human rights situation in China. 
D.  Proxy-Blocking Identity-Concealing Technology 
The 2003 version of the Global Internet Freedom Act included a 
promising proposal: the use of government-funded, proxy-blocking 
 158. Another possible, but highly theoretical, solution that Congress could employ 
is to set the penalties associated with violating the Act at a level high enough to 
significantly harm the company’s profits in China, but not so high as to deter the 
company from exiting the market completely.  The penalties must be set so that shareholders 
would still profit, albeit very slightly, from their investment in the offending company.  
As a result, the shareholder would not have an incentive to pressure the company to 
withdraw because the shareholder would still benefit more financially from the 
company’s presence in China than its absence and would instead pressure China to 
change.  A somewhat relevant example would be the European Union’s imposition of a 
$600 million fine on Microsoft for breach of European antitrust regulations.  Microsoft 
had ample knowledge of the antitrust regulations, but the size of the market convinced 
Microsoft to breach these regulations.  Unlike the China situation, though, Microsoft’s 
shareholders allowed Microsoft to remain in Europe.  The idea behind the fines in the 
Act would be to set recurring fines at a level that would force action.  See Paul Meller, 
Microsoft Pays Fine Imposed by Europe, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2004, at C7. 
 159. Many of the New York Times articles cited by this Comment appeared on the 
front page.  In particular, Clive Thompson’s piece, Google’s China Problem (and 
China’s Google Problem), appeared on the front cover of the New York Times Magazine 
on April 23, 2006.  See generally source cited infra note 160; Thompson, supra note 29. 
 160. Google created the for-profit philanthropist group, the Google Foundation, 
with $1 billion of seed money.  Katie Hafner, Philanthropy Google’s Way: Not the 
Usual, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2006, at A1. 
 161. See Google.org Homepage, http://google.org/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2008). 




technology to tunnel past China’s censors.162  In the United States, 
proxy-blocking technology appeals to those users who wish to hide 
personal information and conceal their Internet history as they navigate 
through different websites.  However, this technology can also circumvent 
censors.  It works as a middleman; instead of connecting directly to a 
website, the middleman will take a user’s order and connect to the site 
under the middleman’s name.163  In this way, the visited site registers the 
middleman’s identity and location, and the actual user remains largely 
anonymous.  Those monitoring the activities of the user will only see 
connections going to and from the middleman.  The use of government 
funds to promote proxy-blocking software in Internet-restrictive countries 
occurred in Iran.164  There the United States enlisted Anonymizer, a 
company specializing in Internet privacy technology, to promote free 
speech and to protect Iranian Internet users from government 
censorship.165 
In March 2006, Anonymizer announced it would take its technology 
to China to help Chinese citizens circumvent the Chinese firewall.166  In 
China, Anonymizer faces two main problems.  The first poses a conundrum: 
how to spread word of a product to circumvent censors when the 
government censors news of that product.  Anonymizer and other similar 
services rely on word of mouth within the Chinese community to solve 
this problem.  The technologically savvy and dedicated online bloggers 
do not need commercial products to circumvent the firewall.  Private 
proxy servers perform the same function as Anonymizer.167  Ideally, 
these technologically savvy users would receive notice about other 
 162. This proposal did not make it into the 2006 or 2007 versions of the Act.  
Compare H.R. 48, 108th Cong. (2003), with H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. (2006), and H.R. 
275, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 163. The middleman’s name is actually the middleman server’s IP address.  Justin 
Boyan originally developed Anonymizer, a proxy-blocking service, in 1995.  He 
explains the history of Anonymizer, how it works, and its flaws on his website, The 
Anonymizer, http://www.december.com/cmc/mag/1997/sep/boyan.html. 
 164. Hiawatha Bray, Beating Censorship on the Internet: Tools Mask User IDs, 
Give Alternative Routes to Sites, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 20, 2006, at A10. 
 165. The Anonymizer, supra note 163; Bray, supra note 164. 
 166. Press Release, Anonymizer, Chinese Citizens Get Censor-Free Internet Through 
Anonymizer (Mar. 31, 2006), available at http://www.anonymizer.com/consumer/media/ 
press_releases/03312006.html.  Anonymizer previously worked with Voice of America 
to develop similar technology for use in China.  See Press Release, Anonymizer, Anonymizer 
to Provide Censor-Free Internet to China (Feb. 1, 2006), available at http://www.anonymizer. 
com/consumer/media/ press_releases/02012006.html. 
 167. A computer in a foreign country may be set up to act as a server, performing 
the same function as Anonymizer in blocking a user’s identity.  However, not all Chinese 
citizens have access to private computers set up in foreign countries. 
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commercial proxy-blocking services during their uncensored surfing and 
spread word to the Chinese community.168 
The active intervention of the Chinese government presents Anonymizer’s 
second problem.  Once the government encounters a proxy-blocking 
site, that site is shut down.  Anonymizer, however, solves this issue 
by maintaining a list of users and informing users each time the website 
hosting the technology changes.169  Ironically, China’s trust in its self-
maintaining firewall also aids Anonymizer, because China does not 
employ people to search the Internet to manually remove offending sites.  
Consequently, the hosting website need not change too frequently, but 
only when caught by this firewall. 
Although programs such as Anonymizer provide an efficient and 
effective short-term solution to eluding China’s filters, these programs may 
conflict with current American security concerns.  Zero Knowledge, an 
early rival to Anonymizer, shut its doors roughly a month after the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.170  Safeweb, another rival partially 
funded by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, shut down its free site 
shortly thereafter.171  Although Zero Knowledge attributed its decision 
to poor business, both sites had come under heavy criticism in the days 
after the attacks for their potential ability to aid and abet terrorists in 
communicating with each other anonymously.172 
Historically, anonymous speech played a vital role in the founding of 
this country. 173  In more recent times, the Supreme Court has upheld the 
 168. Word can be spread either verbally, online, or via cell phone. 
 169. When Anonymizer for Chinese citizens was first released in March 2006, it 
was located at http://www.xifuchun.com/.  However, this site no longer exists.  Only 
Chinese users of this service know its current URL.  See Press Release, Anonymizer 
(Feb. 1, 2006), supra note 166. 
 170. Julie Hilden, The Death of Anonymous Speech on the Internet? How September 11 
May Alter Our First Amendment Rights Online, FINDLAW, Nov. 29, 2001, http://writ. 
news.findlaw.com/hilden/20011129.html. 
 171. Id.  Safeweb has since been bought out by Symantec, and has discontinued its 
services.  See Safeweb, http://www.safeweb.com (last visited Mar. 14, 2008) (transferring 
searches to the Symantec site). 
 172. See Hilden, supra note 170. 
 173. In the days preceding the American Revolution, political activists published 
their views anonymously to avoid British retribution.  See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (“Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the 
majority.”); see also id. at 360 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“There is little doubt that the 
Framers engaged in anonymous political writing.”).  Similarly, Alexander Hamilton, 
John Jay, and James Madison published the Federalist Papers under the pseudonym 
Publius.  See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (“Even the Federalist Papers, written 
in favor of our Constitution, were published under fictitious names.”).  Even today, 




right of religious and political activists to express their views anonymously.174  
However, as a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and 
the revelation that the terrorists communicated with each other online, 
anonymity on the Internet has begun to erode.175 
Investigations of terrorist organizations after the attacks on September 
11 revealed the extent of terrorist dependence on the Internet.  Terrorist 
groups such as Al-Qaeda use the Internet for recruitment and promotion 
of their activities.176  These groups release videos of their exploits as 
well as training materials for would-be terrorists online.177  In addition, 
terrorists communicate with each other in Internet chat rooms.178 
In the interest of protecting national security, President Bush granted 
greater power to law enforcement officials.  Five years after the attacks, 
many of these actions still curtail the range of anonymous speech on the 
Internet.  For example, the renewal of the Patriot Act in 2005 also 
extended the life of a provision that gave government agencies expanded 
surveillance powers.179  More famously, President Bush allegedly issued 
an executive order authorizing the National Security Agency (NSA) to 
eavesdrop on Americans inside the United States.180  This warrantless 
politicians and their staff members regularly communicate anonymously with the press.  
Anonymous speech in politics is often necessary to preserve one’s public image.  See 
Mark Leibovich, Foley Case Upsets Tough Balance of Capitol Hill’s Gay Republicans, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at A1 (“[M]any gay Republicans interviewed for this article . . .  
would speak only anonymously for fear of adversely affecting their career.”). 
 174. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 
536 U.S. 150, 151–52 (2002) (holding an ordinance, requiring solicitors and canvassers 
to obtain and display a permit prior to engaging in door-to-door solicitation, to be in 
violation of the First Amendment); see also McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357 (weighing the 
value of free speech against its misuse in political campaigning and holding that the state 
cannot bar all anonymous election-related pamphleting). 
 175. See Jennifer B. Wieland, Note, Death of Publius: Toward a World Without 
Anonymous Speech, 17 J.L. & POL. 589, 625–27 (2001) (noting that ISPs have agreed to 
work with the government in an unspecified manner and that the FBI will now employ 
technology to read encrypted Internet messages of suspected terrorists). 
 176. Hilden, supra note 170; Robert F. Worth, Jihadists Take Stand on Web, and 
Some Say It’s Defensive, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at A22. 
 177. Hilden, supra note 170. 
 178. See Worth, supra note 176. 
 179. The Patriot Act amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
(FISA).  See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2000); 
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Passes Legislation To Renew Patriot Act, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
3, 2006, at A14.  On September 28, 2006, the House of Representatives passed a bill that 
would “update” the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).  Electronic Surveillance 
Modernization Act, H.R. 5825, 109th Cong. (as passed by House, Sep. 28, 2006). 
 180. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.  However, the Bush Administration insists that this 
news report is grossly inaccurate.  The investigation continues into whether the President 
issued this executive order.  The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), a public 
policy group dedicated to protecting privacy and freedom of speech on the Internet, has 
filed a lawsuit against the Department of Justice seeking documents relating to the order 
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eavesdropping included reading the emails of any citizen linked, even 
indirectly, to suspected terrorists.181 
Despite the threat to national security, the United States government 
should not condemn the use of proxy-blocking services to aid Chinese 
citizens in defeating censorship because proxy-blocking services appear 
to be the best solution at this time.  Many Chinese Internet users already 
utilize this service to shield their identities.  Further, Anonymizer allows 
citizens to exercise free speech online absent fear of potential persecution 
from their government.  Because this promotion of online anonymous 
speech may harm America’s national security, the United States 
government is unlikely to fund this enterprise.  Even if this service goes 
against current United States domestic policy, this country cannot forget 
its historical roots in anonymous speech, its worldwide place as the 
champion of free speech, and the human lives at stake in China absent 
this solution.  Funding or not condemning the use of proxy-blocking 
technology in China would be the best short-term solution. 
E.  International Internet Control 
In 1999, the Hague Conference on Private International Law adopted 
the preliminary draft of a treaty that would enforce judgments across 
international borders.  Notably, the treaty would include Internet 
regulations.182  However, despite fourteen years of negotiations, the 
treaty remains unfinished with no end in sight.183  Even if the treaty 
materializes, member states may not endorse it without extensive 
objections, if at all.  In 2005, the Hague Conference finished the Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements.  This scaled-down treaty, which excludes 
common Internet issues such as copyright and intellectual property 
issues, languishes unsigned by any member state.184 
of NSA surveillance.  The complaint can be found on EPIC’s website at http://www.epic. 
org/privacy/nsa/complaint_doj.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2008). 
 181. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 180, at A16. 
 182. Proposed Hague Conference Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, http://www. 
cptech.org/ecom/jurisdiction/hague.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2008) (preliminary drafts 
and meeting minutes). 
 183. See id. 
 184. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294, 
available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php? act=conventions.text&cid=98.  Under 
this treaty, signatories agree to recognize and enforce judicial decisions reached by other 
signatory states.  Id. 




Fortunately, a treaty may not be necessary in this realm because the 
Internet Corporations for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 
already functions as an international treaty organization.185  ICANN is 
the nonprofit entity in charge of assigning and managing domain names 
and IP addresses, a function vital to the survival and organization of the 
Internet.186  The ICANN concept emerged during the Clinton Administration 
in response to the growing privatization of the Internet and the fear that 
national governments would impose upon the global arena of the 
Internet inconsistent or conflicting national laws.187  As a result of its 
birth in the United States, ICANN operates under a contract with the 
Department of Commerce from ICANN’s headquarters in California.188  
All potential conflicts fall under California state law and the United 
States government theoretically has the final word over ICANN’s 
actions.189  However, the United States has never acted on this authority.190  
The international community perceives this conflict of interest—the 
mere possibility that one country could control the Internet—as 
particularly unsettling.191 
However, ICANN’s position as the incumbent international Internet 
regulatory agency may yet be salvageable.  Professor Jonathan Weinberg 
aptly notes that ICANN functions in many ways like an administrative 
agency with a single exception.192  Unlike administrative agencies, 
 185. The remarkable thing about ICANN is that it is an international body set to 
solve international issues, but was created absent a treaty or international negotiation.  
Milton Mueller, Dancing the Quango: ICANN and the Privatization of International 
Governance 6 (Feb. 11, 2002), available at http://ischool.syr.edu/~mueller/quango.pdf. 
 186. Id. at 1. 
 187. Id. at 3.  Ironically, the Act would impose laws that conflict with Chinese laws. 
 188. See Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 
2032–33 (2006).  For other private alternatives to ICANN, see Michael Froomkin, 
Habermas@Discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
749, 798–817 (2003).  To date, ICANN still operates from California.  In fact, ICANN 
held its last meeting in “its home town of Los Angeles.”  30th International Public 
ICANN Meeting, http://losangeles2007.icann.org/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2008). 
 189. “Externally, ICANN is an organisation incorporated under the law of the State 
of California in the United States.  That means ICANN must abide by the laws of the 
United States and can be called to account by the judicial system i.e. ICANN can be 
taken to court.”  About ICANN, http://losangeles2007.icann.org/icann (last visited Mar. 
14, 2008). 
 190. Victoria Shannon, Other Nations Hope to Loosen U.S. Grip on Internet, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2005, at C14. 
 191. Id.  In contrast, opponents of international control point to the supporters of 
this proposal: the Internet-restrictive countries of China, Iran, and Syria, along with the 
European Union and its member states.  Id. 
 192. For example, ICANN appoints its own board of directors, which is not 
accountable to the international community or general American public.  See Jonathan 
Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 235–36 (2000).  
ICANN has no need to reach a consensus on its decisions and, in fact, will choose to 
exclude the views of those who do not come from technological backgrounds.  Id. at 249 
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ICANN’s decisions are not subject to review by any independent body 
other than ICANN itself.193  This only furthers criticism over the opaqueness 
of ICANN’s decisions and fuels the international fear that the United 
States controls the Internet because ICANN is based in the United 
States. 
Professor Weinberg does not suggest judicial review of ICANN’s 
decisions but instead advises ICANN to gain legitimacy through its 
substantive decisions and to decide technological questions while refraining 
from setting policy.194  Although wholly plausible, this suggestion seems 
to entrust ICANN with the duty of building its own reputation in the 
international community, when much of that community has already 
formed its opinion against ICANN.195  As Weinberg observes, ICANN 
needs legitimacy and acceptance to accomplish its goals because 
ICANN rests on a precarious perch and cannot afford to antagonize its 
sponsoring government, important Internet companies, and sources of 
funding.196  It would be in ICANN’s interest to actively seek some type 
of independent review of its rulings outside the United States to provide 
the international community with at least the illusion of fairness and to 
distance itself from the United States.  By establishing itself as a 
legitimate international Internet regulatory agency, ICANN can assist in 
solving the Chinese Google problem. 
(noting ICANN excludes “people with no understanding of ICANN”).  According to 
Weinberg, ICANN also sets policy and creates legal relationships.  See id. at 223–24.  
ICANN argues that it does not set policy, but performs a highly technological function—
the regulation of domain names.  Yet, Weinberg counters, the very issues of 
trademark dispute resolution and cybersquatting are at heart issues of policy that 
concern technology and are not purely technological questions.  Id. at 223.  In addition, 
to endorse its own legitimacy, ICANN has adopted three techniques of administrative 
agencies: it publicized the techniques it follows in making policy rulings, developed a 
formal procedure for review of the rulings, and adopted requirements of standing, 
timeliness, and exhaustion with regard to the reviews of its rulings.  Id. at 224.  
However, ICANN cannot transform itself into an administrative agency because it still 
does not answer to the United States government.  Id. at 225–29. 
 193. Id. at 231–35.  Weinberg also notes that no ICANN institution exists to 
perform the function that judicial review performs for administrative agencies.  Id. at 
233. 
 194. See id. at 259–60. 
 195. See Jennifer L. Schenker, Nations Chafe at U.S. Influence Over the Internet, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at C1. 
 196. Weinberg, supra note 192, at 255–56.  “ICANN is the product of a somewhat 
precarious bargain between the Internet technical hierarchy, a few major e-commerce 
and telecommunications firms, the intellectual property interests . . . the European 
Union, the US Department of Commerce, and one or two other national governments, 
notably Australia.”  Mueller, supra note 185, at 7. 




The United States and the international community itself fail to aid 
ICANN in this endeavor.  In September 2006, the United States Department 
of Commerce renewed its three-year contract with ICANN.197  In exchange, 
the United Nations created an Internet Governance Forum, aimed at 
developing international Internet policy.198  Despite being a promising 
step in the creation of an international body, the majority of Internet 
corporations are based in the United States, which is a direct result of the 
Internet originating in the United States.199  Although the United States’s 
invention of the Internet does not grant the United States property rights 
over the Internet, it does mean that efforts toward moving the Internet 
under international control are likely to be stalled by the United States 
and its army of Internet corporations.200   
F.  China and the World Trade Organization 
On December 11, 2001, China committed itself to the international 
community when it became the one hundred and forty-third member of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO).201  In reaching this point, China 
agreed to all WTO agreements, including the provisions requiring 
application of Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment.202  Commentators 
 197. Joint Project Agreement Between the U.S. Department of Commerce and the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (Sept. 29, 2006), http://www. 
icann.org/general/JPA-29sep06.pdf.  This move undermines the international community’s 
belief that ICANN acts independently.  Victoria Shannon, U.S. Loosens Its Control Over 
Web Address Manager, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at C4. 
 198. The Internet Governance Forum (IGF), http://www.intgovforum.org (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2008) (providing IGF’s policy and current projects).  The 2006 meeting 
of the Internet Governance Forum focused on the use of non-Latin characters in domain 
names.  Some countries, China included, see the sole use of Latin characters in domain 
names as an attack upon their culture.  Victoria Shannon, A Web Conflict Centers On 
Languages Used in Addresses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at C9. 
 199. Internet corporations refer to companies primarily engaged in Internet 
infrastructure and content development. 
 200. The fact that the United States invented the Internet is not as important as the 
fact that the vast number of Internet hardware and service corporations still remain in the 
United States.  The lobbying power of these corporations will make it difficult to 
implement policy against their best wishes.  Conversely, though, with the majority of 
Internet corporations headquartered in the United States, this country is in a unique 
position to spearhead international Internet policy.  However, this suggestion would not 
be taken well within the international community. 
 201. Jeffrey L. Gertler, China’s WTO Accession—The Final Countdown, in CHINA 
AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 55, 61 (Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds., 2003). 
 202. Most favored nation (MFN) status accords the receiving country equal 
treatment with any other country in the WTO.  Id. The United States granted China MFN 
status but can remove this status to punish China for its human rights violation, thus 
placing China at a trade disadvantage relative to other countries that trade with the 
United States.  Unfortunately, the offending corporations as well as all other American 
corporations profiting in China will lobby against this proposal.  See Tom Zeller, Jr., 
Web Firms Questioned On Dealings In China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2006, at C1. 
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noted China’s new willingness to reduce its tariff and nontariff barriers 
and to allow foreign competition within its borders.203  More importantly, 
China is now bound by the rules of the WTO and must resolve its trade 
disputes under international law.204  It is possible that over time the 
global marketplace and the WTO will force China to accept and follow 
international law. 
Moreover, the pressure of the international economic community, as 
opposed to the international community as a whole (such as that 
embodied in the United Nations), has already prevailed against China’s 
attempt to create its own closed wireless Internet standard.  In 2003, 
China required all Wi-Fi devices within its borders to incorporate 
WLAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI) 
technology.205  WAPI forces every user of a wireless network to register 
with a centralized authentication point.206  However, under pressure 
from the WTO, China ultimately suspended this attempt to create and 
control the underlying standards governing Internet 207
IV.   RECOMMENDATION 
Some experts believe the issue is still unripe for meaningful 
discussion, and that when the time does arrive to take action, only a 
 203. See generally id.; see also Shi Guangsheng, Introduction: Working Together 
for a Brighter Future Based on Mutual Benefit, in CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO 
15, 15–21 (Henry Gao & Donald Lewis eds., 2005). 
 204. Qingjiang Kong, Enforcement of WTO Agreements in China: Illusion or 
Reality?, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 201, at 132.  However, 
if China violates the WTO agreements it is entirely possible that China will not submit to 
the WTO’s dispute resolution system.  This is on account of South Korea’s and Japan’s 
particularly negative experiences with the same system.  For an explanation of their 
experience, see Henry Gao, Aggressive Legalism: The East Asian Experience and 
Lessons for China, in CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO, supra note 203, at 315, 322–
34. 
 205. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 98, at 101. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 102.  The authors also aptly note that while China may attempt to control 
the Internet by controlling the standards guarding access and use, other offenders attempt 
to exercise control in different formats on different topics.  As discussed before, ICANN 
holds tightly to its jurisdiction over domain name registration from its base in the United 
States.  In Europe, regulators applied the continent’s broad privacy laws to the Microsoft 
Internet service’s collection of user data.  These laws forced Microsoft to implement 
global changes to its service.  Id. at 174–77; see Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, Working Document on On-line Authentication Services 4–11 (Jan. 29, 2003), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp68_en.pdf. 




globally directed and implemented solution will suffice.208  The future 
long-term solution may consider cultural perceptions of the Internet, 
redefining geographic and political borders, and possibly rewriting the 
underlying structure of the Internet itself.209 
However, this Comment only addresses the short-term solution to 
China’s censorship of the Internet and subsequent persecution of its 
citizens.  This Comment also suggests a multipronged approach 
encompassing the use of proxy-blocking services, international economic 
pressure, and the passage of an abbreviated version of the Global Online 
Internet Act. 
Savvy Chinese Internet users already use proxy-blocking services 
such as Anonymizer.  Although the funding for these programs may run 
against current United States public policy, this nation has had a long 
history of promoting anonymous speech and must continue to promote 
this in China.  Moreover, against a background of radical political change 
and vaguely written law, interested Chinese citizens already use word of 
mouth to spread information and can easily spread information about 
Anonymizer and other similar services that can circumvent government 
censors. 
The international community may leverage China’s recent entry into 
the WTO against China to encourage a retreat from Internet censorship.  
While free market forces direct corporations into China and the lure of 
profits compel them to comply with Chinese laws, the international 
community must not forget that China’s desire to join the world 
economy is reciprocal to the world’s desire to invest in China.  
International economic pressure has the potential to effect substantial 
change in China. 
Although this solution may lessen the extent of the human rights 
violations, it fails to regulate American corporations in China, especially 
those that cooperate with Chinese censorship laws.  Here, the Global 
Online Freedom Act can play its role.  If passed in an abbreviated form, 
the bill can apply fines against American companies that participate in 
Chinese censorship without involving the Department of State in the 
enforcement of American laws abroad. 
 208. “[T]he United States, China, and Europe are using their coercive powers to 
establish different visions of what the Internet might be. . . . The result is the beginning 
of a technological version of the cold war, with each side pushing its own vision of the 
Internet’s future.”  GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 98, at 184. 
 209. See generally id.; LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 
(1999) (arguing that the very architecture of cyberspace can be changed to address 
Internet-related economic and legal problems); Jonathan Zittrain, Saving the Internet, 
HARV. BUS. REV., June 2007, at 49, 55 (focusing on how domestic trends towards user-
friendly Internet devices may stifle creativity). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Chinese censorship and the subsequent prosecution of its online 
writers presents a serious problem that continues to escalate each day as 
the Chinese firewall grows in complexity and sophistication.  Although 
the Internet was once considered uncontrollable by any one nation, with 
the aid of American corporations China is succeeding in creating a 
second-tier Internet—one that increasingly delivers only news approved 
by the government.  The complicity of these American corporations, 
coupled with the complacency of their shareholders, requires the United 
States and the international community to create and implement a 
solution to reintroduce freedom of speech in China.210 
However, the chosen solution must consider the worldwide implications 
resulting from its implementation.  Even though the Global Online Freedom 
Act in its current form would go against American public policy, the use 
of both proxy-blocking services and international economic pressure to 
create change in China would not.  Instead, these recommendations 


















 210. One of Google’s founders, Sergey Brin, recently admitted, “On a business 
level, that decision to enter China was a net negative based on our reputation in the rest 
of the world suffering.”  However, Google has not committed to a change in policy.  
Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Google Links Setbacks in China to Problems with Local 
Net Rivals, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2007, at 8. 
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